A Reaction Function for the Bank of the Central African States in a Context of Fiscal Dominance by BIKAI, J. Landry & MBOHOU M., Moustapha
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
A Reaction Function for the Bank of the
Central African States in a Context of
Fiscal Dominance
J. Landry BIKAI and Moustapha MBOHOU M.
Bank of Central African States
30 November 2016
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/89108/
MPRA Paper No. 89108, posted 24 September 2018 08:33 UTC
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Reaction Function for the Bank of the Central African States in a 
Context of Fiscal Dominance 
 
 
BIKAI Jacques Landry
1
   and   MBOHOU MAMA Moustapha
2
 
 
November 2016 
 
Abstract 
The aim of this study is to estimate the reaction function of the BEAC and to assess the extent to which the monetary 
policy is influenced by the evolution of the financial situation of the States members of the CEMAC. We estimated two 
reaction functions of the Central Bank according to its two main monetary policy instruments: the monetary base and the 
policy rate, by taking into account the potential role of fiscal dominance. Estimates of quarterly data for Mc Callum rule 
for the monetary base and Taylor rule for the key interest rate in the CEMAC countries, over the period 1996 to 2013, 
revealed four major results. Firstly, we find that in the event of economic overheating, BEAC contracts the monetary 
base and releases it to support activity in the slowdown phases, revealing the sensitivity of the Central Bank to the 
evolution of the economic situation in the CEMAC when manipulating its monetary base. Secondly, the BEAC policy 
rate does not respond to the output gap or the inflation, due in part to the weakness of the transmission mechanisms and 
the inoperability of the interest rate channel. Thirdly, our results indicate that BEAC carries out a very high rate 
smoothing and the associated coefficient is of the order of 0.98, reflecting the uncertainties on the effects of its action. As 
for the fourth result, he indicates that the conduct of monetary policy is influenced by the financial situation of the States 
thus validating the hypothesis of fiscal dominance. We find, however, that fiscal dominance is more pronounced in the 
policy of managing the monetary base than in the policy rate setting strategy. 
Keywords : monetary policy, prices stability, central bank. 
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Non-technical summary 
The present study focuses on the Central Bank's reaction to its main objectives (inflation gap and support to 
activity) and to the financial situation of the States of the Economic and Monetary Community of Central 
Africa (CEMAC). The BEAC's reaction function is captured in this study through the two main instruments 
available to the BEAC: the monetary base and the interest rate. This study seeks is to account for the 
behaviour of the BEAC in the conduct of monetary policy. To do this, two types of monetary policy rules are 
estimated: a rule to evaluate the monetary base's fixing behavior, and a rule to evaluate the rate-setting 
behavior. However, in both forms of rules, we take into account the potential role of fiscal dominance by 
introducing into each of the rules, the Government's Net Position (PNG), which represents the difference 
between the liabilities and the assets of the State. 
The estimates based on quarterly data of the Mc Callum type rules for the monetary base and the Taylor type 
for the key rate in the CEMAC countries over the period 1996Q1 to 2013Q4, revealed four major results: 
(i)The first result indicates that the Central Bank is sensitive to the evolution of the economic situation in the 
CEMAC when it manipulates its monetary base. In other words, in the event of economic overheating, it 
contracts the monetary base and releases it to support activity in the slowdown phases. 
(ii) The second result indicates that the BEAC policy rate does not respond to the output gap or the inflation 
gap due to weak transmission mechanisms and the ineffectiveness of the interest rate channel; 
(iii) The third major result indicates that the BEAC proceeds to a very high interest rate smoothing and the 
corresponding coefficient is about 0.98, reflecting the uncertainties on the effects of its action. 
(iv) The fourth result indicates that the conduct of monetary policy is influenced by the financial situation of 
States, thus validating the hypothesis of fiscal dominance in the subregion. However, fiscal dominance is more 
pronounced with regard to the policy of managing the monetary base compared to the strategy of policy rate 
setting. 
As a recommendation, the low sensitivity of the BEAC policy rate to the inflation and output gaps identified 
in this study calls for appropriate measures to make monetary policy transmission mechanisms work, as 
actions on policy rates have virtually no significant effect on the output and prices. To this end, it is 
recommended to accelerate the completion of the actions undertaken in the context of the ongoing monetary 
policy reform, in particular for the development and deepening of the financial system of the Zone. The 
establishment of a market in negotiable debt securities and the repo market is expected to contribute 
significantly to the broadening of the range of exchangeable financial instruments in the banking market and 
to the dynamization of the interbank component of the money market of the CEMAC. The sensitivity of the 
BEAC to the financial situation of States underlines the need to strengthen the framework for the coordination 
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of monetary and fiscal policies in order to limit the perverse effects of fiscal dominance in the sub-region, and 
reinforce the independence of the Central Bank. 
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Introduction 
Taking into account the expectations of economic agents and information asymmetries in assessing the 
effectiveness of economic policy decisions is at the origin of the adoption of the rules. Indeed, the economic 
debate around the rules of economic policy dates back to Kydland and Prescott (1977) in their seminal article 
entitled "rules rather than discretion", where they show the primacy of rules over discretion in monetary 
policy. According to these authors, the strategies of rule-based decision-makers increase their credibility and 
are more optimal than those based on discretion. 
These theoretical developments have considerably influenced the profound changes observed in the conduct 
of monetary policy since the 1990s, both in developed and developing countries, notably through the setting of 
price stability as the main objective of monetary policy. Indeed, the priority given to price stability at the 
central bank level stems from the theoretical consensus around the crucial role of a central bank's credibility in 
the effectiveness of its monetary policy decisions. Far from being an asset, this credibility is itself conditioned 
by the transparency and the adoption of rules in the conduct of monetary policy (Barro and Gordon, 1983). 
The literature distinguishes two categories of monetary policy rules: (i) "passive" rules, which are, 
independent of the state of the economy, such as Friedman's k% rule according to which the central bank 
should target a constant growth rate of the money supply, and (ii) the "actives", which provide that the 
direction of monetary policy may be modified according to events affecting the economy (Drumetz and 
Verdelhan , 1997). 
Despite their operational simplicity, the "passive" rules have been gradually abandoned by central banks, in 
particular because of the limited scope for active monetary policy management. To this end, we will focus on 
active rules, which are mainly concerned with rules for the modification of monetary aggregates and rules for 
fixing interest rates. 
The active rules for modifying monetary aggregates, initially theorized by Mc Callum (1988), emphasize the 
consistency between monetary changes, price stability and nominal GDP growth in the medium term in the 
economy. Most of the central banks that have adopted them have simultaneously pursued a monetary 
aggregate control strategy, relying mainly on the stability of the link between money supply and inflation and 
the demand for money. However, the erosion of the link between the money supply and inflation related to the 
increasing instability of the demand for money, due to the development and deepening of the financial sector, 
justified the gradual abandonment of monetary aggregate control in favour of the management of interest rates 
in the early 1990s. 
In terms of interest rate setting, Taylor (1993, 1999) is the first author to propose a descriptive rule for the 
Federal Reserve's (Fed) rate policy. The rule that bears its name is a reference both normative and explanatory 
of the monetary policy of the Fed (Bricongne and Fournier, 2008). Indeed, according to Orphanides (2007), 
the Taylor rule is a simple rule of monetary policy that prescribes how a central bank should adjust its interest 
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rate instruments systematically in response to changes in inflation and economic activity. Since then, much 
work has contributed to improving the specification of this rule, including many other macroeconomic 
variables followed by central banks in the development and implementation of their monetary policy. 
Monetary reforms in the Central African Monetary Union (UMAC) in the mid-1990s led to the inclusion of 
monetary stability as a primary objective for the BEAC. This objective has two dimensions: internal, linked to 
price stability through a weak increase in inflation and, externally, linked to an adequate external money 
coverage rate, with a minimum threshold of 20%. Nevertheless, in accordance with Article 1 of its Statutes, 
without prejudice to the objective of monetary stability, the BEAC supports the economic policies elaborated 
in the subregion. In addition, the current configuration of the UMAC gives the central bank the possibility of 
providing direct and supervised support to the States, which may justify the sensitivity of the BEAC to the 
budgetary situation of the States and thus compromise the objectives. 
To achieve these objectives, the BEAC uses a set of indirect instruments, which are organized around two 
main pillars: the refinancing policy on the money market through manipulation of the monetary base (action 
on quantities through the monetary programming) and the setting of its key rate (action by rates). In the 
context of the monetary programming exercise, the BEAC determines a reference level for the growth of the 
money supply and, ultimately, the monetary base, consistent with monetary stability over the medium term. 
Regarding its interest rate policy, the BEAC has a discount rate, the tender rate (TIAO), which is its main 
policy rate. 
After more than two decades of action, this policy should be assessed. Does the central bank really take into 
account activity and prices in the manipulation of its instruments or is it more influenced by the financial 
situation of the states? 
The purpose of this study is to take into account the behaviour of the BEAC in the conduct of monetary 
policy. Given the "two-pillar" strategy pursued by the BEAC, including actions on quantities (materialized 
here by the Mc Callum rule) and rates (materialized in the study by the Taylor type rule). 
This study has a dual interest for the conduct of BEAC monetary policy. It seeks to identify the behavior of 
the Central Bank vis-à-vis its main objectives and its sensitivity to the financial situation of States, but it also 
makes it possible, by comparing the two types of rules used (Mc Callum and Taylor) to select the rule that 
better describes the behavior of the Central Bank. Moreover, by characterizing the systematic element of the 
behavior of the Central Bank, and by adopting the rule that best fits the realities of CEMAC economies, this 
study offers an important input to the construction of DSGE simulation models of the effects of economic 
policies
3
 for the BEAC, which are under construction as part of the monetary policy reform. 
                                                          
3
 The construction of structural models for the BEAC to evaluate the effects of monetary policy can thus be inspired by 
this work. 
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The rest of the paper is structured around three sections. The first presents a review of the economic literature 
on active monetary policy rules with an emphasis on fiscal dominance. The second approach addresses the 
methodological aspects of estimating a BEAC reaction function. The third focuses on the analysis of results 
and the resulting recommendations. 
I. The literature on the active monetary policy rules of central banks 
1. Rules based on the control of monetary aggregates: the McCallum type rules 
One of the most famous monetary policy rules based on the control of monetary aggregates is 
undoubtedly the one developed in 1988 by Bennett McCallum. Simply described, this rule stipulates a rate of 
growth of the monetary base anchored to the growth of real output with adjustments to account for changes in 
money velocity and deviations from nominal expenditure in relation to a previously established target ( 
Racette et al., 1992). 
Indeed, McCallum builds his argument on two main consensus raised in the literature: the superiority 
of rule-based policies in relation to discretionary actions, as established by the work of Kydland and Prescott 
(1977), and the independence of the long-run movement of the real variables in relation to the average growth 
rate of the nominal variables. This last point, coupled with the absence of a dominant macroeconomic model 
that explains the short-run evolution of large aggregates and, more specifically, the division of nominal output 
into real and monetary components, prompted it to choose nominal income as a target of the monetary 
authorities. 
According to McCallum (1988), the monetary base directly controlled by central banks is more 
appropriate to control changes in activity and prices. Practically, the McCallum rule implies that the central 
bank influences the rate of growth of the monetary base so that nominal GDP grows steadily at a non-
inflationary rate corresponding to the long-run real growth rate. The central bank is therefore asked to 
modulate monetary policy according to the gap between the potential GDP ( ̅) and the actual GDP (   , that 
is :  
        ̅       (  ̅                 (   
In this equation,      represents the growth rate of the monetary policy instrument, which is here the 
monetary base;   ̅ is the target of the nominal GDP growth rate;     is the average velocity rate of the money 
defined as the ratio of nominal GDP to the monetary base; and (  ̅       is the growth gap, thus 
representing the central bank's reaction function. The parameter   (     thus represents the reaction factor 
of the central bank to the growth gap. In this expression, a low value of   implies a weak central bank 
reaction to the output gap, a high value indicating exactly the inverse, with risks of dynamic instability. Mc 
Callum (1988) assumed that the value of   can be set to 0.5 
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The control of Monetary aggregate was in fact adopted in the 1970s by several countries, including 
Switzerland and Germany, which were promoted better partisans of the monetarist school of thought for their 
control of inflation. Other countries have used this strategy in the same way as the United States (under the era 
of Paul Volker
4
), Canada, the United Kingdom or Japan. 
Following Mc Callum, several studies empirically assessed the performance of such a rule for 
developed countries (Hall 1990, Judd and Montley 1991, 1993, Dueker 1993, Todd 1994, Stark and Croushore 
1996, Razzak 2003) or emerging (Liu and Zhang 2007; Kong 2008). 
In the 1980s, financial liberalization and financial development led to a considerable change in the 
money velocity in some countries and made monetary policies based on the control of monetary aggregates 
insufficient to ensure price stability. Indeed, financial development and the introduction of sophisticated 
financial instruments that substitute for money have challenged the ability of central banks to control the 
supply of money and induce instability in the demand for money. 
These changes have led many central banks in the early 1990s to focus more on indirect monetary 
policy instruments, based on the interest rate management. This shift in the conduct of monetary policy also 
coincided with the evolution of the objectives assigned to central banks, namely the stability of prices, with 
the adoption by many of them, of inflation targets and / or inflation targeting strategy. 
2. Rules for setting interest rates : Taylor rules 
 
Most central banks use the Taylor rule either to construct more sophisticated models (the DSGEs), or as an 
indicator in the optimal conduct of monetary policy. However, beyond interpretations often assigned to the 
Taylor rule, it should be emphasized that several specifications of this rule have been proposed. Indeed, its 
initial formulation dates back to Taylor (1993) for the American case and had the following form: 
 
            (                         (   
 
Where   is the central bank interest rate (or federal funds rate), p is the rate of inflation over the past 
four quarters, y is the output gap
 5
. Finally,     represents the difference between observed inflation and the 
Central Bank inflation target, which is 2%. According to Taylor, the central bank's short-term interest rate 
must rise when expected inflation exceeds the central bank's inflation target or when the real GDP is above its 
long-term trend (potential GDP). And when inflation is equal to the 2% target, and GDP reaches its trend 
value, the real interest rate (     will be 2%. 
This rule therefore provides guidance on the weight that the central bank attaches to price stability and output 
in the conduct of its monetary policy. Taylor (1993) chooses 0.5 as the weight for both objectives in the US 
                                                          
4
 He was Director of the Federal Reserve of the United States from 1979 to 1987. 
5
 It is a measure of the degree of overheating in the economy and is obtained by differentiating between real GDP and 
potential GDP relative to potential GDP. 
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case, but recognizes that this weight may change from one country to another. Thus, by comparing the interest 
rates derived from this rule with the observed rates, one can judge the adequacy of monetary policy to the 
fundamental economic variables. And Taylor has shown that this rule reproduces well the evolution of the 
interest rate of the United States during the period 1987-1992. However, as originally formulated, the Taylor 
rule is generally subject to several criticisms. 
 
First of all, with respect to its variables, the uncertainty associated with their construction can lead to 
divergent results. Indeed, with respect to the real interest rate, for example, Taylor sets it at 2%, which also 
represents the trend growth rate of the US economy over the period under review. However, this choice, 
which is underpinned by the neutrality
6
 of monetary policy with respect to long-term activity, is not shared by 
all authors. Sachs (1996), Drumetz and Verdelhan (1997) retain a rate of 3.5%, while Smets (1998) and 
Kozicki (1999) considered a real interest rate which is equal to the average of the gap between the nominal 
interest rate and the inflation rate over the period under review. Verdelhan (1998) subsequently advocated the 
possibility of setting the inflation target a priori and then deducting the real interest rate. The calculation of the 
output gap depends on the method of determining the potential GDP and the choice of the smoothing 
parameter of the data. 
In addition to the limitations associated with the determination of variables, the initial specification of 
the Taylor rule is criticized because it assumes that the monetary policy stance of the central bank is mainly 
determined based on information of the current period, thus reducing the ability of central banks to use all 
available information both in terms of the past and upcoming events. 
Taking into account these last limits allowed the introduction of lagged and / or anticipated variables 
in the initial Taylor rule. Sachs (1996), for example, introduced inflation expectations instead of current 
inflation and obtained the following more general formulation: 
                      (                      (   
 
In this specification, the expected inflation rate (pa) is sometimes approximated by the inflation of the 
previous period;       is the neutral real interest rate that allows long-term equilibrium and by reference to 
neoclassical theory, it is often considered that this neutral rate is equal to the potential growth of the economy; 
  et   are positive parameters that measure respectively the weight that the central bank gives to the 
stabilization of activity and prices. 
 
However, the introduction of the anticipated variables exposes the Taylor rule to an additional limit related to 
the fact that its determination requires information that is sometimes unavailable (Mc Callum, 1993). Taking 
                                                          
6
 Indeed, in the long run, the inflation target is reached and the output gap is zero, so the nominal interest rate is such that 
the real interest rate is equal to the real neutral rate, ie to the potential growth rate , reflecting the neutrality of the long-
term interest rate on economic activity 
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account of adaptive and then rational expectations has thus led to two other specifications of the Taylor rule: a 
specification giving rise to "backward-looking" behaviours (equation 4), and another giving rise to "forward-
looking" behaviours (equation 5). 
 
                   (                                (   
               (    |       (             |                      (   
 
In the equation (5)   ( |    denotes the expectation conditional to the information available to the 
central bank at time t, that is, at the moment when it makes its decision, while    materializes all of this 
information and i is the anticipation horizon. 
Subsequently, several studies have investigated the smoothing effect of the interest rate on the basis 
that the Taylor rule as defined does not capture the central bank's tendency to smooth the fluctuations of the 
interest rate to avoid its volatility. Indeed, in the event of uncertainties about the effects of interest rate control 
on economic dynamics, central banks tend to smooth out the changes in their key interest rates (Sack, 2000). 
The central bank's assumption of smoothing of key rates is a reflection of an adaptation of their function of 
reaction to the constraints of the functioning of the economy in order to take account of the behavior of the 
agents and especially the mechanism of formation of their expectations. Finally, the smoothing of the interest 
rate is justified by the fact that the central bank wants to avoid rate instability and preserve its credibility 
among economic agents. Hence, smoothing interest rate fluctuations is a kind of response to the uncertainty of 
any monetary policy decision. 
Among the authors who proposed a smoothing of the interest rate are Rudebusch (1995), Sack (1998), 
Clarida and Gertler (1996), Orphanides (1997), Verdelhan (1998) and Gertler (2000). The specification of the 
Taylor rule integrating the smoothing of the policy interest rate is generally as follows: 
     (      
                               (   
Where   
  represents one of the rules specified above (3) or (4) so that we have : 
     (                     (                                         (   
Or 
     (                 (    |       (             |                           (   
 
In these specifications, ρ represents the interest rate smoothing parameter and its value is between 0 
and 1 Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) estimated the value of    to be 0.8 for the case of the United States. 
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It should be noted, however, that in view of the wide range of indicators and variables used regularly 
by central banks for the conduct of their monetary policy, many studies have attempted to introduce additional 
variables into the Taylor rule , including: the exchange rate, the lagged interest rate, the money supply, the 
prices of raw materials, etc. Regarding the Franc Zone, Tenou (2002) estimated the reaction function of the 
Central Bank of West African States (BCEAO) by adding as an additional variable the interest rate differential 
between the zone and France which is the main partner country of this area. However, several authors have 
focused more on adding the exchange rate in the Taylor rule, such as Ball (1999), Svensson (2000), Taylor 
(2001). And the generally accepted specification (where     represents the exchange rate at period t) is as 
follows: 
   (                 (    |       (             |                   (   
 
3. Taking into account the fiscal dominance in the conduct of monetary policy 
Through works on the fiscal theory of the general level of prices, recent developments in the literature 
on the rules led to the consideration of the implications of fiscal dominance on the conduct of monetary policy 
by the Central Banks. The fiscal theory of the price level runs counter to the monetarist thesis that inflation is 
always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon (monetary domination) and argues that the rise in 
uncontrolled budget deficits can accelerate inflation in a context of limited independence of the central bank. 
Thus, high inflation induced by expansionary fiscal policy may hamper the conduct of monetary policy. 
Fiscal dominance refers to contexts where monetary policy orientations are strongly dictated by those 
of fiscal policy (Cochrane, 2001, Bergin 2000, Benhabib, et al 2001, Woodford, 2001, Afonso, 2002, Zoli, 
2005) . In other words, the central bank sets and modifies its instruments according to the stakes related to the 
management of the public debt, either for the sake of coordination with fiscal policy in the context of a policy 
mix, or simply because of the pressures that the fiscal authorities directly exert on it. Fiscal dominance 
assumes that the central bank also has a goal of maintaining the country's fiscal solvency. This implies that in 
certain crisis situations where intertemporal fiscal solvency is no longer assured, the central bank restores it by 
increasing the money supply or by reducing its key interest rates. 
Empirically, fiscal dominance can be captured by integrating a budgetary variable into the central 
bank's reaction function, such as the government spending gap relative to its target value (Kumhof et al., 
2007) or the primary deficit Ekpo et al., 2015): 
   (                 (    |       (             |                  (  
                                                                                 (   
   (                 (    |       (             |                
  (                                                               (    
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II. Estimation of a BEAC reaction function 
1. Methodological approach 
As mentioned above, the monetary policy strategy currently pursued by the BEAC is revolves around 
"two pillars", with actions aimed at controlling money aggregates, in particular through monetary 
programming, and actions aimed at managing interest rate on the money market through the setting of its key 
interest rate (the interest rate on tenders - TIAO). 
To take account of this specificity noted in the conduct of the monetary policy of the Issuing Institute, 
we will retain the two categories of rule (Mc Callum and Taylor) for the specification of the reaction function 
of the BEAC. For the formulation of the Taylor-type rule for the BEAC, like Tenou (2010) for the case of the 
BCEAO, and drawing on the work of Sachs (1996), Orphanides (1997) , Kozicki (1999) and Clarida, Gali and 
Gertler (2000), we will adopt a forward looking rule specification. The values of the expected variables 
(inflation and output) are described by partial adjustment mechanisms of their current levels to the target. 
With respect to the Mc Callum rule, we will retain the formulation of Racette et al. (1992). 
For each of these rules, the main innovation brought to the baseline theoretical formulations is the 
introduction of new variables to take account of the specific characteristics of BEAC's monetary policy 
framework and context. Indeed, the net external position of the governments (PNG) vis-à-vis the financial 
system was introduced in order to assess the hypothesis of fiscal dominance in BEAC's monetary policy 
orientations. The choice of PNG to take account of fiscal dominance, instead of the primary deficit (Ekpo et 
al., 2015) or the gap in public spending relative to their target (Kumhof et al., 2007) observed in the literature, 
is simply justified by the unavailability of these variables at a quarterly frequency in the Zone.  
McCallum rule to be estimated for the BEAC is as follows: 
      (    
         (        
    (        
    (    )      (11) 
With : 
     : percentage change of the monetary base; 
    
  is the output gap or the gap between production and its potential level in percentage; 
   : variation in the money velocity; 
    : the net position of the Governments vis-à-vis the financial sector as a whole; 
        
  : PNG deviation from its target level as a percentage; 
     : Net foreign assets; 
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   the NEA deviation from its target level in percentage; πt − π 
 
the inflation deviation with 
respect to its target value; 
     est l’écart d’inflation par rapport à sa valeur cible ; 
  ,  ,   and   : parameters to be estimated. 
For the interest rate rule, we will estimate an 'augmented Taylor rule' that also includes net foreign 
assets (NEA) to take account of the nature of the fixed exchange rate regime in effect in the CEMAC. In a 
fixed exchange rate regime, the central bank should be concerned, in addition to the internal variables 
(production and inflation), of a variable related to the rate of coverage of the money, in particular external 
assets, which, in practice could be seen as an objective in its own. Indeed, the guarantee of a fixed parity 
requires the monetary authorities to pay particular attention to the variables of external balance (Ertugrul et al., 
2005). 
Thus, for the Taylor rule, the model is then written 
   (             (             (          
       (          
       (          
    
                                                 (    
E : mathematical expectation operator; 
   : the BEAC steering interest rates, TIAO; 
      : real equilibrium interest rate; 
   : inflation rate; 
  (          
 : output gap or gap between expected output and its potential level; 
   (          
   : gap between the expected inflation rate and the target inflation rate; 
  : smoothing parameter to be estimated. Its value is between 0 and 1 ;  
   : set of information available at time t ; 
 , ,   and   parameters to be estimated; 
   : all variables taken into account in the conduct of the BEAC monetary policy. They include net foreign 
assets (AENt) and the net position of Governments vis-à-vis the financial sector as a whole (PNGt). 
Assuming a partial adjustment of the expected variables, using the following equation: 
 (            (            (      
   where     is a parameter between 0 and 1 measuring the 
credibility of the target, the Taylor reaction function is then as follows: 
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          (    [           (    ) 
     (    
      (    
      (    
   ]        
              (                                               
By rearranging equation (13), we obtain the final model of the reaction function to be estimated: 
           (    (       
    (    
    (    
    (    
           (                   
 With       (     ;       (     et      (      
 
2. Data and variables of the study 
Estimates of the reaction functions of the BEAC monetary policy were made over the period 1996-
2013 from the following quarterly data sets available to the BEAC: i) the BEAC TIAO, its main policy rate; 
(ii) the net position of the Governments vis-à-vis the CEMAC financial system; (iii) CEMAC quarter-on-
quarter inflation rate, calculated from household consumer price indices, (iv) CEMAC GDP, interpolated to 
quarterly frequency by the Goldstein and Khan method (1976), (v) the output gap in the CEMAC, calculated 
using the Hodrick Prescott filter with a parameter λ = 1600, (vi) the net external assets at a quarterly 
frequency, (vii) the quarterly monetary base in the CEMAC, and (viii) the velocity of money at a quarterly 
frequency. 
3. Estimation methods 
The specification of the Mc Callum rule does not really pose a problem of estimation, compared to 
that of the Taylor rule, whose estimation requires more adapted methods to control the endogeneity bias 
associated with the existence of the lagged endogenous variable among the explanatory variables and the non-
observability of the anticipated variables. 
Three estimation methods are generally used for this purpose: the generalized method of momments 
(GMM), the instrumental variables approach and the cointegration approach of Johansen (1991). 
The development of the GMM method was due to the growing interest in the early 1980s for rational 
expectations models. Indeed, the problem of endogeneity observed sometimes arises from the fact that authors 
who cannot dispose of the expected inflation, generally use the output GAP instead (Svenson, 1997): 
                                              (    
Thus, the expected inflation obtained becomes endogenous and the most appropriate estimation 
method then becomes that of the generalized moments. This method allows, among other things, to check the 
potential endogeneity of all the explanatory variables. 
Nevertheless, other authors use the instrumental variables method, and take as instruments the output 
GAP, lagged inflation, and interest rates (Mayes, 2000). 
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As for the cointegration approach of Johansen (1991), besides controlling the endogenous bias of 
some variables, it allows to estimate a robust relation in the presence of non-stationary variables. 
This latter method is preferred for the estimation of the Taylor type reaction function for BEAC.  
III. Results of the BEAC monetary policy reaction function 
Equations (11) and (14) are estimated over three periods: the overall period of the study (1996Q-
2013Q4) and two subperiods (1996Q-2005Q3 and 2005Q3-2013Q4). The subdivision of the estimation period 
into two subperiods is dictated by the change of regime observed in the evolution of PNG in the CEMAC. 
Figure 1 : Evolution of PNG in the CEMAC 
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Source: Authors based on data from BEAC and national administrations. 
Indeed, as the PNG is the difference between government liabilities and assets, the oil boom in the 
early 2000s, due to the good performance of oil prices, resulted in an increase in revenues (negative PNG) of 
most CEMAC member countries due to the influx of large oil revenues. In this context, the surplus of income 
generated by the States has resulted in an improvement in their net position vis-à-vis the financial sector. The 
results of our estimates are shown in Tables 1 and 2 below. 
For the Mc Callum-type rule, the results generally show that the central bank's adjustments of the 
monetary base were mainly influenced by the inflation gap, the economic situation reflected in the output gap, 
and finally the financial situation of States, through the fluctuations of PNGs around their long-term trend. 
The negative sign associated with the output gap reflects the fact that in the event of economic overheating, 
the BEAC contracts the monetary base and releases it to support activity in phases of insufficient growth. 
Similarly, in the context of the regulation of bank liquidity, the acceleration of inflation has, on average, led 
the Central Bank to limit the growth of the supply of central money to credit institutions. Although relatively 
small in magnitude, the influence of the financial position of states on the monetary base adjustments made by 
the BEAC appears to be significant over the study period as a whole. The positive sign associated with PNG 
fluctuations around its long-term trend corroborates the fiscal dominance hypothesis. The deterioration of the 
Oil boom         
Period 
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net financial positions of the States vis-à-vis the financial system has, on average, been associated with an 
increase in the supply of central money to the economy, in particular through direct advances from the Central 
Bank to National treasures. 
The results also highlight a structural change in the behavior of the Central Bank in line with the 
state's financial situation. Indeed, the period before the oil boom (1996Q1-2005Q3) ) shows a higher 
sensitivity of the monetary base to the financial situation of the states
7
 , compared to the period 2005Q3-
2013Q4 (0,13068> 0.00159). In other words, during good times, the management policies of the monetary 
base adopted by the Central Bank are less sensitive to the evolution of the overall fiscal situation of the States 
in the sub-region. On the other hand, in a context of less favorable fiscal conditions, the Emission Institute has 
been more sensitive to the overall fiscal situation of the Member States of the Union. A Chow test carried out 
on the parameter associated with the variable (        
   leads to a structural change in the value of this 
parameter between the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2005, the period beginning the reversal of the net financial 
position of States on the financial sector (see table 1 in the appendices). 
We also observe that the increase in the monetary base translates into a significant decrease in the 
velocity of money, thus reflecting a progressive financial development, illustrated in particular by the 
increasing use of electronic money. 
Table 1: Results of the estimation of a McCallum rule for BEAC 
  
  
Variables 
       Total sample 
  
1996Q1-2013Q4 
Before the oil  boom 
  
1996Q1-2005Q3 
After the oil 
boom 
  
2005Q3-2013Q4 
    -0.85729*** -0.92200*** -0.796354*** 
    
  
  
  
(-5.905505) 
  
-0.48965*** 
(-3.312281) 
  
(-5.357095) 
  
 -0.52064*** 
(-3.799254) 
  
(-3.828447) 
  
-0.78614* 
(-1.761093) 
  
     
  -0.138839* -0.166144* -0.274881 
  
(-1.705641) 
  
(-1.938926) 
  
(-0.488064) 
  
  
        
  
0.00247* 0.13068* 0.00159** 
  
(1.825579) 
  
(1.838911) 
  
(2.293354) 
  
        
  0.01709 0.02188  0.38257  
                                                          
7
 Materialized here by the PNG deviation from its trend  
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(1.415072) (1.610979) (1.505815) 
        
Observations 71 68 68 
R-squared 0.40 0.66 0.019 
The Student T-Statistics are in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Source: Authors’ estimates 
 
As for the Taylor rule, the coefficients associated with inflation and activity are not significant, despite 
the fact that their signs are consistent with the prediction of the theory, thus reflecting a low sensitivity of the 
Central Bank policy rate to these variables. This result is consistent with previous studies notably that of Bikai 
and Kenkouo (2015), which showed the weakness and inefficiency of the interest rate channel in the CEMAC. 
On the other hand, the coefficient of the lagged interest rate is 0.98, reflecting BEAC smoothing 
behaviour in the setting of its key policy rate. This coefficient is close to that obtained by Tenou (2013) on 
quarterly data from the BCEAO that is 0.9. The very high effect of the interest rate smoothing is explained by 
the existence of uncertainties about the effects of steering the central bank's interest rate on economic activity 
and inflation in the CEMAC. Indeed, in the face of uncertainty about the transmission channels of monetary 
policy, high and rapid changes in the key rate can lead to uncontrolled and unanticipated effects on the real 
sphere. In such a context, it seems useful for Central Banks to adopt an optimal behavior consisting in limiting 
the amplitude of variation of their key interest rate (Clarida et al., 2000). 
Moreover, the negative and significant coefficients associated with the PNG evolution suggests that 
the central bank is also sensitive to the evolution of the public finance situation in fixing its rate. The 
hypothesis of fiscal dominance observed in the case of the adjustment of the monetary base also seems to be 
valid for the fixing of the Central Bank's key rate. However, the sensitivity of the policy rate to changes in 
PNG is more pronounced during periods of unfavourable fiscal conditions. Indeed, estimates obtained on the 
sub-period before the oil boom give a significant coefficient associated with the PNG and being almost the 
double of the one obtained on the global sample (0.000155 <0.000277). The hypothesis of structural change of 
the parameter associated with PNG fluctuations between the 2nd and 3rd quarters of 2005 is also corroborated 
by a Chow test, the results of which are recorded in Table 2 in the appendix. 
However, the degree of fiscal dominance seems limited when considering the manipulation of interest 
rates relative to the monetary base (0.000155 <0.130791). This may be related to the variable chosen to 
capture the influence of the fiscal policy of the states on the conduct of the monetary policy of the BEAC. 
Indeed, through direct advances from the Central Bank to National Treasuries, PNG opens a direct channel 
through which the dynamics of state fiscal policies affect the BEAC's monetary policy stance. 
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Moreover, the results of the estimates for the two sub-periods before and after the oil boom highlight a 
more systematic response by the issuance Institute to inflation and net external assets. However, the sensitivity 
of the Central Bank's key rate to the inflation differential is higher in the oil boom period. This underlines the 
tendency for the central bank to take more account of the risks of accelerating inflation in setting its policy 
rate during this period. In contrast, the policy rate of the issuance Institute seems less sensitive to the evolution 
of net external assets during the good times. This intuitive result is explained by the fact that the significant 
expansion of net external assets during the period contributed to loosening the constraint on external balance, 
thereby providing more room for action for the monetary policy of the Central Bank to pursue internal 
objectives of price stability and support for economic growth. 
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Tableau 2: Results of Estimates of an augmented Taylor Rule for the BEAC 
Dependent Variable:TIAO=    
   
Total sample 
 
1996Q1-2013Q4 
 
Before the oil boom 
 
1996Q1-2005Q3 
After the oil boom 
 
2005Q3-2013Q4 
  
      0.982688*** 0.980009**     0.96022*** 
  (12.04650) (2.333785) (3.413989) 
      +  
  0.015643** 0.306923*** 0.120597* 
  (2.606538) (3.933795) (2.046938) 
     
  0.001174 0.016668* 0.036929* 
  (0.127992) (1.760534) (1.860276) 
     
  0.005228 0.004793 0.037260 
  (1.189621) (1.476093) (1.403129) 
         
  -0.000155*** -0.000277*** -0.004834 
  (-2.271801) (-2.784397) (-1.236738) 
         
  2.87E-05 -0.001249*** 0.023603* 
  (0.054747) (-2.893446) (1.774821) 
Observations 68 35 34 
R-squared 0.98 0.96 0.95 
The student T-statistics are in parentheses  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
Source: Authors’ estimates  
Figure 2 below shows, on the same level, the rates simulated from the estimated Taylor rule and the rates 
actually set by the BEAC. Overall, it is clear that the monetary policy of the BEAC is well represented by the 
estimated monetary policy rule. 
Figure 2 : Comparative trends in TIAO and policy rates calculated on the basis of the Taylor Rule 
.03
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Tiao effectifs de la BEAC
Tiao simulés (1996Q1-2005Q3)
Tiao simulés (1996Q1-2013Q4)
Tiao simulés (2005Q3-2013Q4)  
Source: Authors Based on Estimates of the Taylor Rule « added ». 
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Conclusion 
This article examined the behaviour of the central bank and the influence of the state's financial 
position on the central bank. To this end, we estimated a BEAC reaction function according to two main 
instruments: the policy rate and the monetary base, while taking into account the potential role of fiscal 
dominance over the period 1996Q1 to 2013Q4. 
Estimates of two types of rules have yielded a number of results. First, the Central Bank is sensitive to 
the evolution of the economic situation in the CEMAC through its policy of manipulation of the monetary 
base. In other words, in the event of economic overheating, it limits the increase in the supply of central 
money and releases it to support activity in the phases of weak growth. Second, the estimate of the augmented 
Taylor rule over the entire period under scrutiny shows that the BEAC policy rate does not respond to the 
output gap and to inflation, due in particular to the weakness of the transmission mechanisms and the 
inoperability of the interest rate channel. The uncertainty of the effects of the interest rate is confirmed by a 
very large smoothing effect of the order of 0.98. Third, for the two types of instruments used by the BEAC, 
the results obtained underline the relative influence of the financial position of the states on the monetary 
policy impulses carried out by the central bank, thus corroborating the hypothesis of fiscal dominance in the 
monetary policy implemented in the sub-region. We find, however, that fiscal dominance is more pronounced 
as regard with the management policy of the monetary base than in the strategy of setting the policy rate. 
Similarly, for each type of instrument, the influence of the financial position of states on monetary policy is 
more pronounced in the period before the oil boom. 
These results give rise to economic policy recommendations related to the implications of fiscal 
dominance in the conduct of monetary policy and the inoperability of the interest rate channel reflecting the 
low sensitivity of the policy rate to the inflation gap and the output gap. 
On fiscal dominance, by highlighting the biases that can be introduced by taking into account the 
financial situation of States in the conduct of the BEAC monetary policy, such a study stresses the need to 
strengthen the framework for the coordination of monetary policies in order to limit the perverse effects of 
fiscal dominance in the sub-region and thus strengthen the independence of the Central Bank. More 
specifically, the elimination of direct advances from the Central Bank to national treasuries would 
considerably limit the influence of the state's financial situation on the strategy of adjusting the Central  
Bank's monetary base. For this purpose, it will be appropriate to lead to its end the process of 
eliminating direct advances from the Central Bank to national treasuries in the CEMAC, suspended in 2014 
following the effects of the double oil and security shock that affected the economies of the sub-region. 
Similarly, the billing of direct advances, currently backed by the interest rate on tenders, should be 
disconnected from the BEAC policy rate. 
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The low sensitivity of the BEAC policy rate to the inflation and output gap identified in this study 
calls for appropriate measures to make monetary policy transmission mechanisms work, as the actions on key 
policy rates have virtually no significant influence on activity and prices. To this end, it is recommended to 
accelerate the completion of the actions undertaken in the context of the ongoing monetary policy reform, in 
particular for the development and deepening of the financial system of the Zone. The establishment of a 
market in negotiable debt securities and the repo market is expected to contribute significantly to the 
broadening of the range of exchangeable financial instruments in the banking market and to the dynamization 
of the interbank component of the money market of the CEMAC. 
Finally, by providing specifications of the monetary policy rules taking into account the current 
context of the BEAC, the results of such a study represent a necessary input in the design of general 
equilibrium models dedicated to economic policy simulations. 
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Appendices 
1. Results of the Chow test on the structural break of the PNG coefficient in the Mc Callum rule for 
the BEAC  
     
Chow Breakpoint Test: 2005Q3   
Null Hypothesis: No breaks at specified breakpoints 
Varying regressors: PNG_GAP  
Equation Sample: 1997Q1 2013Q4  
     
     F-statistic 7.945267  Prob. F(1,62) 0.0065 
Log likelihood ratio 8.199349  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0042 
Wald Statistic  7.945267  Prob. Chi-Square(1) 0.0048 
     
     
 
 
2. Results of the Chow test on the structural failure of the PNG coefficient in the Taylor rule for the 
BEAC 
Breakpoint Test: 2005Q3   
Equation Sample: 1997Q1 2013Q4  
     
     Andrews-Fair Wald Stat. 9.225115  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0613 
Andrews-Fair LR-type D Stat. 21.21360  Prob. Chi-Square(6) 0.0017 
Hall and Sen O Stat. 0.000000    
     
     
 
